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# Investigation of serious aviation incident at Molde Airport

During landing at Molde Airport Årø on Thursday 19 December 2024, the crew was unable to stop the aircraft on the runway. The airplane, Norwegian LN-NIP Boeing 737-800, overshot the end of the runway and ended up with the nosewheel off the prepared surface, a few meters from the sea.

Norwegian flight DY430 took off from Gardermoen airport towards Molde on Thursday 19 December 2024 at 1820 local time (1720 UTC). The crew had received information concerning the weather and runway condition ahead of the flight. The last weather observation (METAR 1650 UTC) and forecast (TAF) indicated light showers of rain and snow with ceiling between 2,000 and 3,000 ft, good visibility and variable winds, with the possibility of temporarily reduced visibility and ceiling. The temperature was +3°C. Current SNOWTAM reported runway wet with Runway Condition Code (RWYCC) 5.

COR METAR ENML 191650Z 28009KT 240V340 9999 -SHRASN SCT012 BKN030 03/M01 Q0982

TAF ENML 191400Z 1915/1924 32018KT 9999 -SHRASN SCT010 BKN020 TEMPO 1915/1923 35022G35KT 2500 SHSNRA BKN007 SCT015CB

SNOWTAM ENML 12191442 07 5/5/5 100/100/100 NR/NR/NR WET/WET/WET

The snow removal team at Molde had completed sweeping the runway at approximately the same time as DY430 took off from Gardermoen. The SNOWTAM was updated at 1822L. Reported runway status was RWYCC 5, and the last two thirds of runway 25 had a 50 % coverage of 3 mm slush. The team leader continued to monitor the runway conditions.

SNOWTAM ENML 12191722 07 5/5/5 50/50/100 03/03/NR SLUSH/SLUSH/WET

During the transit the pilots discussed the weather situation and computed landing distances. Due to the wind the crew elected to fly a non-precision approach to runway 25.

At 1847L, approximately 16 minutes before landing, the aircrew checked the latest ATIS (Automatic Terminal Information Service – airport information updated every 20 and 50 minutes past the hour). ATIS information KILO, valid from 1850L, included the runway status from 1822 that reported RWYCC 5. There were no major changes to the weather compared to the previous ATIS.

About the same time, the snow removal team leader at Molde had completed a new assessment of the runway conditions. According to the new SNOWTAM the runway was covered 100 % by 3 mm slush, and the RWYCC had been downgraded from 5 to 4. The new assessment resulted in a new ATIS information LIMA being released at 1852L.

SNOWTAM ENML 12191747 07 4/4/4 100/100/100 03/03/03 SLUSH/SLUSH/SLUSH

At 1857L, approximately 6 minutes before landing, the aircrew started a turn to intercept the localizer to runway 25 and was asked to contact the tower at Molde. Molde AFIS informed that a new ATIS (information LIMA) was valid. The aircrew acknowledged this but did not have time to tune and listen to the latest information.

At 1859L the snow removal team leader contacted Molde tower with an update to the runway condition as he left the runway. He informed that there were some slippery sections of the runway, but the RWYCC was still 4. At about the same time the aircrew of DY430 contacted the tower and asked whether the latest ATIS included any changes in visibility. The tower reported that the visibility was 10 km or more and informed the aircrew of the RWYCC was still 4, with some slippery sections around the threshold. This is the first time the crew realizes that the RWYCC has been reduced from 5 to 4.

The aircrew did a new calculation of landing distances based on the updated runway condition. Due to turbulence during the approach they also checked whether they had sufficient runway available if they reduced flaps from 40 to 30. The calculations were done with wind from 290 degrees at 15 knots (11 knot headwind) and indicated they had sufficient stopping distance for autobrake 3 or more.

The airplane broke out of the clouds at approximately 2,000 ft and gained visual contact with the runway. When they descended through approximately 850 ft on final (approximately 1 minute before landing) they entered a heavy shower of rain and snow but kept the runway in sight. They crossed the threshold of runway 25 within normal parameters. About the same time the wind changed momentarily from northwest (headwind) to north-northeast (tailwind), resulting in the pilot adding power to compensate for the drop in airspeed. The airplane ended up floating and touching down just over 700 meters after the threshold (approximately 100 m after the end of the touch down zone markings on the runway) at an airspeed of 157 knots (9 knots above the airspeed for which the landing distance calculations were made). According to the crew the runway markings were not visible due to the slush covering the runway and they were not aware how far down the runway they touched down.

Full reverse thrust was selected promptly after landing; however, the pilot did not experience that the airplane decelerated as expected. As a result, he initiated full manual braking. As it became evident that they would not be able to stop on the runway the pilot gave a left rudder input in an attempt to increase the deceleration by skidding. The airplane crossed the threshold of runway 07 and continued through the asphalted runway end safety area. When the airplane stopped the main wheels were on the asphalt, while the nose wheel was on a stoney slope between the runway and the sea. Due to concerns of whether the airplane could start to slide down towards the sea the pilot in command decided to evacuate the airplane. The airplane had stopped at an angle compared to the runway direction with the right-hand side closest to the sea, and the passengers and crew were evacuated on the left side only to ensure a safer distance to the sea. The evacuation was conducted through the forward and aft slides. The slide at the wing was not used.

Following the incident the aerodrome operator Avinor has decided to install Simple Touch Down Zone Lights at Molde airport. The lights are installed at the end of the touch down zone markings on the runway, and the purpose of the lights is to provide pilots with enhanced situational awareness in all visibility conditions and to help enable pilots to decide whether to commence a go around if the aircraft has not landed by a certain point on the runway.

## Status of investigation

The investigation is ongoing.

Latest update: 18.12.2025

## Facts

Location	Molde Airport, Norway
Occurrence date	19.12.2024
ICAO Location indicator	ENML
Aircraft	Boeing 737-600/700/800
Operator	Norwegian Air Shuttle
Registration	LN-NIP
Meteorological conditions	IMC
County	Møre og Romsdal
Type of occurrence	Serious incident
Type of operation	Scheduled air transport
Category of operation	Heavy, aeroplane (> 10 000kg)
Aircraft category	Landplane, Multi-engine, Turbofan/Turbojet

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