Report on engine fire in military vehicle, M113A2, at Setermoen in Bardu municipality on 28 January 2022

Defence report 2023/01

The fire started in one of the Armed Forces’ M113A2 armoured personnel carriers that was taking part in a skidpan driving exercise. No one was injured in the incident. The investigation has shown that the Armed Forces have recorded at least 22 similar fires in the same type of vehicle since 2002. Temporary safety measures to prevent fire have been in place since 2010, but the cause of the technical problems has not been identified and resolved.

Foto Per Anders Bjørklund, Forsvaret.png
Photo: Per Anders Bjørklund/Norwegian Armed Forces

The cause of the fire in this incident differs slightly from the other 21 fires recorded, most of which started in or at the connections to the generator. In this case, the fire started in the same wiring, but appears to have started in a cable entry at the driver’s seat and in the engine compartment. The cables had been detached and connected as a safety measure to prevent fire when garaging the vehicle.

The approach had been designed and introduced by the army unit that was using the vehicle, in conflict with a previously issued safety notice from the competent authority for the Armed Forces as a whole. The safety notice prescribed disconnecting the negative terminal from the battery of the M113A2 to prevent fire in the generator and the electrical system during garaging. The unit was of the view that this entailed a risk for the drivers, however, and therefore introduced their own approach.

The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority (NSIA) believes the unit’s approach was the combined result of several fires that had involved M113 vehicles without the technical problems having been identified and resolved. The investigation has shown that no defence sector bodies have had a complete overview of the number of fires that have occurred in the Armed Forces’ M113A2 vehicles, and that the competent authority has lacked the ability to follow up the safety risk associated with the materiel in question. The measure that had been introduced improved safety during garaging and storage, but did not address the cause of the fire or resolve the risk to personnel when using the vehicle.

Furthermore, the NSIA is of the opinion that cooperation between the Army, as the operator, and the competent authority has been inadequate. Good cooperation between the different defence sector bodies is necessary to contribute to safe operations. Overall, the investigation has shown that the Army’s safety management, the competent authority’s materiel management and the Armed Forces Materiel Safety Authority’s follow-up of the fires involving the Army’s M113A2 vehicles have been inadequate.

The NSIA submits three safety recommendations as a result of the investigation, including a recommendation to introduce a ban on using the vehicle.

This report is in Norwegian only.

Published 05.01.2023

Safety recommendation

Safety recommendation Defence no. 2023/01T

The fire that occurred in one of the Armed Forces’ M113A2 vehicles on 28 January 2022 was the twenty-second fire recorded in this type of vehicle over a period of 20 years. The investigation has shown that the existing system support for materiel follow-up in the defence sector did not allow for a comprehensive overview. The technical fault relating to the fire in/near the generator of the M113A2 vehicles was not identified, analysed or remedied.

The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that the Norwegian Armed Forces, in cooperation with the Norwegian Defence Materiel Agency, ensure a comprehensive overview of incidents and nonconformities associated with the different materiel configurations.

Safety recommendation Defence no. 2023/02T

The fire that occurred in one of the Armed Forces’ M113A2 vehicles on 28 January 2022 was the twenty-second fire recorded in this type of vehicle over a period of 20 years. In 2015, the Norwegian Defence Logistics Organisation’s Land Systems Division (FLO Landkap) submitted an application to the Army Staff for a safety upgrade of the generator. A risk assessment that showed a high risk to personnel was enclosed with the application. The Land Systems Division informed the Army Staff that failure to replace the generator could lead to a ban on using the vehicle. The Army Staff rejected the application for funds to remedy the generator, and the safety-critical measure was not followed up further. A technical materiel order (MTO 1892) issued by the Norwegian Defence Materiel Agency’s Land Systems Division (FMA Landkap) in 2021 and the Army’s safety notice issued in 2022 improved safety during garaging and storage, but did not address the cause of the fires or resolve the risk to personnel when using the vehicle.

The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that the Norwegian Defence Materiel Agency’s Land Systems Division (FMA Landkap) introduce a ban on using M113A2 F1 and F2 variants until the risk to defence personnel has been reduced.

Safety recommendation Defence no. 2023/03T

The fire that occurred in one of the Armed Forces’ M113A2 vehicles on 28 January 2022 was the twenty-second fire recorded in this type of vehicle over a period of 20 years. The investigation has shown that the Army’s safety management, the competent authority’s materiel management and the Armed Forces Materiel Safety Authority’s follow-up of the incidents involving the Army’s M113A2 vehicles have been inadequate. Furthermore, the Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority considers that cooperation between the Army, as the operator, and the competent authority represented by the Norwegian Defence Logistics Organisation’s Land Systems Division (FLO Landkap) (later the Norwegian Defence Materiel Agency’s Land Systems Division (FMA Landkap)) has been inadequate. Good cooperation between the different defence sector bodies is necessary to contribute to safe operations.

The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that the Ministry of Defence review cooperation between the competent authority and the operators in the Armed Forces to ensure that proposals for safety-critical measures are implemented.

Facts

Location Setermoen, Bardu municipality
Occurrence date 28.01.2022
Category of Occurrence Incident
Defence branch The Norwegian Army