2013/11
Marine report 2013/11
On Wednesday 5 December 2012, a member of the crew died while fishing on board the purse seiner Artus. The accident occurred while the extra line for tightening the float line was being hauled. The fisherman who died was squeezed against the warping drum on the starboard anchor winch under several layers of 32 mm nylon rope. The winch arrangement was designed so that two people would be present during use of the warping drum: one to handle the control lever and one to handle the rope on the drum. On board the fishing vessel, it had become established practice for one man to do this alone. In the AIBN's opinion, this is an unsafe work practice.
Occupational accidents in connection with the handling of fishing gear and tools are a regular occurrence in the ocean-going fishing fleet. The AIBN believes that the accident on board Artus should not be seen as a unique incident, but rather as one of many occupational accidents that occur in connection with the handling of fishing gear in this part of the fleet, and has chosen to see the accident in this light.
The AIBN's investigation emphasises two areas in which improvements should be made to increase crew safety during fishing operations from fishing vessels.
The first area concerns safety management in the operating phase. The investigation has shown that, prior to the accident, the owners' safety management was inadequate in relation to operations on board the purse seiner. The AIBN has made similar observations in previous investigations. When a vessel is put into operation, any risks that have not been addressed during the design and building phase must be addressed by the owners and crew. In that connection, the owners' ability to map risks, conduct risk assessments and implement measures is a very important barrier against accidents in connection with the fishing and production process. It is also essential to establish a systematic approach so that unsafe work practices can be identified and changed.
The second area concerns weaknesses during the design and building of fishing vessels. The current regulations contain few and unclear requirements to ensure the safety of fishermen when they use fishing gear and tools. The regulations contain no requirements for risk assessments relating to the operation of the vessel to be conducted already in the design phase. This can result in effective safety barriers not being built in and in the safety of the crew becoming overly dependent on organisational factors relating to the operation of the vessel. Both building regulations and occupational safety regulations should contribute more to ensuring operational safety than they do at present. An important lesson to be learnt from this accident is that the owners' safety work must be initiated already in the design phase. The owners must play an active role and involve the users, and they must use qualified HSE personnel to conduct a critical review of the design solutions, and thus ensure safer working conditions for the fishermen who are to operate the vessel.
The AIBN does not propose any safety recommendations in connection with this investigation. The shipping company has implemented a number of measures directly related to preventing similar accidents in future. Furthermore, in several previous investigations, the AIBN has addressed safety recommendations to the authorities concerning the absence of requirements for risk assessments in the design phase, shortcomings of currently applicable regulations on operational safety and the owners' lack of ability to identify risks and implement measures.
This report is in Norwegian only. English summary is included.
Facts
| Location | South of Mandal |
| Occurrence date | 05.12.2012 |
| Accident category | Personal injury |
| Area | Norwegian Economic Zone |
| IMO number | 9565429 |
| Name of vessel | Artus |
| Accident type | Fatal Accident, Occupational accident |
| Vessel type | Fishing Vessel |
| Register | The Norwegian Ship Register |