Report on air accident in the sea west of Sotra, Vestland County, Norway on 28 February 2024 with Sikorsky S-92A, LN-OIJ, operated by Bristow Norway AS
Aviation report 2026/03
On the evening of Wednesday 28 February 2024, a Sikorsky S-92A helicopter, LN-OIJ, operated by Bristow Norway AS crashed during SAR training in night conditions after departing from Flesland (ENBR). A technical failure of a circuit card in the actuator that controls the helicopter pitch while flying on autopilot in combination with organisational factors were significant contributors to the accident occurring.
The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority’s (NSIA) investigation into the accident finds that the helicopter’s pitch attitude increased uncontrolled until it was no longer possible for the pilots to regain control. The helicopter started to accelerate backwards and crashed into the sea. One person was fatally injured and five others received injuries in the accident that occurred during a SAR training mission. The helicopter was operated by Bristow Norway on behalf of Equinor.
The accident occurred at night, and the crew did not have any external visual references. The abnormal pitch increase was also not registered on the instruments in time.
Three to six seconds to react
The helicopter was about to position itself over a training beacon when the accident occurred. The helicopter was flown with the SAR autopilot mode “Mark on Top” (MOT).
Based on the investigation the NISA holds the opinion that the crew had between three and six seconds to recognise that an expected pitch increase had become abnormal and take manual control of the helicopter.
The pitch attitude of the helicopter was at the most almost 30° and the main rotors of the helicopter therefore pulled the helicopter backwards before it impacted the sea.
An increased risk due to the training regime and ambiguous procedures
Both the pilots were experienced S-92A pilots, but new in their respective SAR roles for Bristow Norway. The NSIA has not found any indication that the crew did not conform to the standard set by Bristow Norway and accepted by the Norwegian Civil Aviation Authority (CAA Norway). The investigation has found several organisational and systemic factors which most likely contributed to the late recognition of the abnormal pitch attitude.
Inadvertent pressure with a tight time schedule
During the spring of 2022, Equinor performed two tender processes for helicopter services. One of these was for SAR services for the southern part of the Norwegian Continental Shelf (SAR South). The start up date was set to one year after the contract was signed. The tight time schedule put a pressure on Bristow Norway as the winner of the tender process. This is the first time that there has been such a tight time schedule for such a complex and extensive contract.
The NSIA has found that Equinor did not sufficiently reflect on any power imbalance during the tender process.
The CAA Norway was aware of the major expansion of Bristow Norway’s SAR organisation, and that they might have room for improvement regarding their structured identification of risk during using a Management of Change process. The NISA has not seen evidence that the CAA Norway used this information by for example asking for Bristow Norway’s documentation about the Management of Change process to provide guidance. The NSIA highlights that it is important that tender processes that leads to major changes have enough room to allow for a thorough and safety focused Management of Change process.
Rescue after 45 minutes – Room for improvement
After the accident the helicopter quickly filled with water and capsized. The surviors spent 45 minutes in the sea before being rescued. The cold was the major challenge, but there were also issues with personal rescue equipment such as lights and Personal Locator Beacons. The investigation has found that there were no unused resources that could have arrived more quickly at the accident site and changed the outcome of the rescue operation.
The Emergency Flotation System (EFS) was armed but did not deploy automatically since the helicopter immediately lost generator power. When the helicopter capsized the handle to release the life rafts were submerged. In addition, there were rough seas and fuel in the water. The survivors could therefore not release the life rafts. Sikorsky is in the process of redesigning the release mechanism so that it can more easily be deployed when the helicopter has capsized. In addition, they are working on redesigning the automatic deployment of the EFS such that it no longer requires generator power. Therefore, the NSIA does not issue Safety Recommendations regarding this topic.
Published 26.02.2026
Safety recommendation
Safety Recommendation Aviation No. 2026/05T
On 28 February 2024 LN-OIJ suffered a loss of control and crashed into the North Sea west of Sotra, Norway during a training mission. The investigation into the accident has had a lot of data available. Even though the NSIA has had good audio recordings from the Cockpit Voice Recorder and recorded flight data from three different sources it has been impossible to unambiguously determine what happened. Cockpit Image Recorder (CIR) data would have been a useful supplement to the already recorded data. Crucially a CIR would have given the NSIA an image of the cockpit and handling of the controls. Several recommendations have already been issued by other safety investigation authorities regarding this topic. The NSIA still find it necessary to use this opportunity to reiterate a safety recommendation.
The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that ICAO expedite its work to make cockpit image recordings mandatory for all newly built aircraft used for commercial air transport.
Safety Recommendation Aviation No. 2026/06T
On 28 February 2024 LN-OIJ suffered a loss of control and crashed into the North Sea west of Sotra, Norway during a training mission. The investigation into the accident has had a lot of data available. Even though the NSIA has had good audio recordings from the Cockpit Voice Recorder and recorded flight data from three different sources it has been impossible to unambiguously determine what happened. Cockpit Image Recorder (CIR) data would have been a useful supplement to the already recorded data. Crucially a CIR would have given the NSIA an image of the cockpit and handling of the controls. Several recommendations have already been issued by other safety investigation authorities regarding this topic. The NSIA still find it necessary to use this opportunity to reiterate a safety recommendation.
The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration expedite its work with the National Transportation Safety Board ‘s recommendation A-15-008 to require that all newly manufactured aircraft operated under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 or 135 are required to have a cockpit voice recorder and a flight data recorder also be equipped with a crash-protected cockpit image recording system compliant with Technical Standard Order TSO-C176a, “Cockpit Image Recorder Equipment,” or equivalent.
Safety Recommendation Aviation No. 2026/07T
On 28 February 2024 LN-OIJ suffered a loss of control and crashed into the North Sea west of Sotra, Norway during a training mission. The investigation into the accident has had a lot of data available. Even though the NSIA has had good audio recordings from the Cockpit Voice Recorder and recorded flight data from three different sources it has been impossible to unambiguously determine what happened. Cockpit Image Recorder (CIR) data would have been a useful supplement to the already recorded data. Crucially a CIR would have given the NSIA an image of the cockpit and handling of the controls. Several recommendations have already been issued by other safety investigation authorities regarding this topic. The NSIA still find it necessary to use this opportunity to reiterate a safety recommendation.
The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that the European Aviation Safety Agency work with the Federal Aviation Administration to timely implement the National Transportation Safety Boards’s recommendation A-15-008 to ensure harmonised rules.
Safety Recommendation Aviation No. 2026/08T
On 28 February 2024 LN-OIJ suffered a loss of control and crashed into the North Sea west of Sotra, Norway during a training mission after excessive pitch up attitude. Six months prior to the accident, Bristow Norway became the operator of three new SAR bases, including the one at Bergen airport, Flesland. This major expansion was the result of a tender process with a short time period between contract award and contract start. This led to a strain on the organisation to be able to train the required personnel and to make the necessary equipment ready.
The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that CAA Norway, in its role as leader of the Samarbeidsforum for helikoptersikkerhet på norsk kontinentalsokkel initiate work to establish guidelines for tender processes, particularly when it comes to Search and Rescue, including but not limited to the timeframe between contract award and contract start.
Safety Recommendation Aviation No. 2026/09T
On 28 February 2024 LN-OIJ suffered a loss of control and crashed into the North Sea west of Sotra, Norway during a training mission after excessive pitch up attitude. After the accident the crew on board had to survive in the sea for about 45 minutes before being rescued. During their time in the sea, they experienced several difficulties with their personal emergency equipment. For example it was difficult to activate the personal locator beacons with cold fingers in the darkness due to a lack of tactile buttons. SAR operations are nationally regulated.
The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that CAA Norway use the findings in this report to evaluate if the current requirements for personal emergency equipment for SAR crews are sufficient and ensure harmonisation.
Safety Recommendation Aviation No. 2026/10T
On 28 February 2024 LN-OIJ suffered a loss of control and crashed into the North Sea west of Sotra, Norway during a training mission after excessive pitch up attitude. After the accident the crew on board had to survive in the sea for about 45 minutes before being rescued. During their time in the sea, they experienced several difficulties with their personal emergency equipment. For example it was difficult to activate the personal locator beacons with cold fingers in the darkness due to a lack of tactile buttons. SAR operations are nationally regulated and there is no international standardisation.
The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that HeliOffshore start work to investigate the possibilities of creating guidelines regarding personal emergency equipment for SAR crews.
Safety Recommendation Aviation No. 2026/11T
On 28 February 2024 LN-OIJ suffered a loss of control and crashed into the North Sea west of Sotra, Norway during a training mission after excessive pitch up attitude. After the accident the crew on board had to survive in the sea for about 45 minutes before being rescued. Time is a critical resource during a rescue operation. The digital tools the rescue coordinators use today do not estimate arrival times that account for weather conditions, such as wind. An estimate of arrival time is done manually by the rescue coordinators based on experience and is one of several considerations that must be balanced when scrambling resources.
The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre expand their digital tools to include an estimation of arrival times for resources which factor-in weather conditions as an additional decision support tool.
Safety Recommendation Aviation No. 2026/12T
On 28 February 2024 LN-OIJ suffered a loss of control and crashed into the North Sea west of Sotra, Norway during a training mission after excessive pitch up attitude. After the accident the crew on board had to survive in the sea for about 45 minutes before being rescued. Over the course of the investigation, it was found that new airworthiness requirements, applicable to helicopters operating over water and introduced in an amendment to EASA Part-26, had not been implemented nor were planned to be. This was due to a misunderstanding regarding the way to show and verify compliance. The CAA Norway therefore issued a set of exemptions to keep the Norwegian S-92A fleet operational.
The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that the European Aviation Safety Agency make the retroactive design changes required by Part-26 more accessible to operators and provide guidance as to the obligations.
Facts
| Location | 2 NM south-west of Løno, west of Sotra in Øygarden municipality in Vestland, Norway |
| Occurrence date | 28.02.2024 |
| ICAO Location indicator | ENBR |
| Aircraft | Sikorsky øvrige |
| Operator | Bristow Norway AS |
| Registration | LN-OIJ |
| Meteorological conditions | VMC |
| County | Vestland |
| Type of occurrence | Accident |
| Type of operation | Offshore |
| Category of operation | Heavy, helicopter (> 2 250kg) |
| Aircraft category | Helicopter, Multi-engine, Turbofan/Turbojet |
| FIR/AOR | ENSV (Stavanger ATCC) |