Report on marine accident on board the motor ferry MF Røst - LDWE, near Skrova on 18 May 2013

Marine report 2014/05 eng

The shipping company Torghatten Nord AS had just deployed MF Røst in the Svolvær-Skutvik-Skrova ferry service. The crew had been given a verbal message from the shipping company not to sail through Fyrsundet sound until further notice, as the aft mast was assumed to be too high for MF Røst to pass under the overhead high-voltage cables. However, the captain and chief mate on duty at the time of the accident believed that it would be possible for MF Røst to pass under the cables. On 18 May 2013, they therefore intended to verify the distance between the vessel's aft mast and the overhead cables. The nautical charts showed a safe vertical clearance of 20 metres, while the signs ashore showed 22 metres. The shipboard management had measured the vessel's air draught to be 20.7 metres from the waterline to the top of the aft mast. On reaching Fyrsundet, the chief mate climbed into the fore mast, that was slightly lower than the aft mast, to observe the passage and to check the margin between the mast and the cables using a fishing rod that he had taken with him. However, as the vessel passed under the last of the three high-voltage cables, the fishing rod came in contact with high-voltage, the chief mate received an electric shock and died as a consequence of falling down from the fore mast. The AIBN investigation found that the information flow in the shipping company was inadequate, that it was a lack of routines in the authorities reporting of chart data and continuous updating of navigational charts, and that the crew was not familiar with the requirement for a safety margin in relation to overhead cables carrying high voltage. The Accident Investigation Board Norway proposes four safety recommendations as a result of the investigation.

Safety recommendation

Safety recommendation MARINE No 2014/08T

The investigation of the accident on board MF Røst on 18 May 2013 has shown that national nautical guidelines urge seafarers to exercise caution when navigating near power lines, but contain no information about the safety margin that is taken into consideration for the safe vertical clearances shown in the charts and on signs ashore when high voltage is involved. One consequence of this may be that seafarers challenge the shown safe vertical clearance and by this comes into the danger zone from high voltage.

The Accident Investigation Board Norway recommends that the International Chamber of Shipping incorporate into its Bridge Procedures Guide practical and relevant advice on height limitations in general, about the safety margin and the safe vertical clearance under power cables that carry high voltage.

Safety recommendation MARINE No 2014/07T

The investigation of the accident on board MF Røst on 18 May 2013 has shown that national nautical guidelines urge seafarers to exercise caution when navigating near power lines, but contain no information about the safety margin that is taken into consideration for the safe vertical clearances shown in the charts and on signs ashore when high voltage is involved. One consequence of this may be that seafarers challenge the shown safe vertical clearance and by this comes into the danger zone from high voltage.

The Accident Investigation Board Norway recommends the Norwegian Hydrographic Service to clarify in relevant publications about the national requirements that applies for the safety margin that is taken into consideration when stating the safe vertical clearance under power cables that carry high voltage.

Safety recommendation MARINE No 2014/06T

The investigation of the accident on board MF Røst on 18 May 2013 has shown that there was justified uncertainty about the safe vertical clearance in the sound. Differences have been found between the safe vertical clearance shown in the charts and the figure shown on the signs ashore. In addition the actual signs were unclear about safety margins in relation to high voltage. Further, the investigation has shown that the power cables in 2013 were lower than the last recorded modification. The consequence of this is that seafarers cannot with certainty know what the correct safe vertical clearance is.

The Accident Investigation Board Norway recommends that the Norwegian Coastal Administration take steps to ensure that the correct safe vertical clearances are unambiguously communicated so that they are clear to seafarers.

Safety recommendation MARINE No 2014/05T

The investigation of the accident on board MF Røst on 18 May 2013 has shown that no risk assessment was available for MF Røst in the new service at the time of the accident and that the communication of safety-critical information, concerning the limitations in the service, was inadequate. The consequence of this was that the crew on board MF Røst ignored the instructions given by the shipping company.

The Accident Investigation Board Norway recommends that Torghatten Nord AS review and improve its internal procedures for communication between the shipping company and vessels, as well as the procedures for carrying out risk assessments before starting to operate a new service or a new vessel.

Facts

Location Skrova, Vågan, Nordland
Occurrence date 18.05.2013
Accident category Personal injury
Area Norwegian Territorial Waters
IMO number 9035709
Name of vessel MF Røst
Accident type Fatal Accident, Fall on board
Vessel type Passenger Ship - Ferry
Register The Norwegian Ship Register

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