2013/07
Railway report 2013/07
While airport express train no 3560 was being prepared for departure, the train driver contacted Flytoget AS's duty traffic controller and stated that problems had been encountered with a high-voltage circuit and a network current converter on board the train. Flytoget AS's traffic controller contacted the shift supervisor at Oslo traffic control centre and informed him about the situation. Prior to this, the high-voltage switch had tripped several times, and the train's information system showed the error message 'fault in power supply'. When a new attempt was made to connect the high voltage switch, a loud noise could be heard inside the train. The train was evacuated with the assistance of the security guards on the platform. The passengers were evacuated back towards the terminal building and to the pedestrian bridge at the southern end of the platform. In the terminal area, the ticket sales area inside the terminal building was emptied of travellers by the ticket sales personnel, and the area was closed off by means of fire curtains. As the evacuated passengers were thus prevented from getting back into the terminal building, they returned to the platform area. They were then also evacuated to the southern end of the platform area. The whole train was checked several times after the evacuation in order to ensure that there were no passengers on board. The driver notified the traffic controller of a fire in the train and subsequently disembarked and visually checked both sides of the train. The shift supervisor at the traffic control centre called 110 and notified the fire service that smoke was issuing from the airport express train at Gardermoen station. The fire service at Oslo Airport (OSL) and Gardermoen intermunicipal fire service (GRIB) arrived shortly afterwards. Police from Romerike Police District and Gardermoen Police Station arrived just after the fire services. Not long after the fire was first notified, the driver of the airport express train notified the traffic control centre that the fire had been extinguished by the train's own fire-extinguishing system. Some time afterwards, the driver of the airport express train reported that the train was again on fire. The fire had continued to smoulder and then flared up again. This report is in Norwegian only.
Safety recommendation
Safety recommendations JB no 2013/05T
The track, platform and railway terminal is owned by the Norwegian National Rail Administration, and Flytoget AS, NSB AS and Narvesen AS lease space in the terminal building. Flytoget AS is the only one of these parties that has procedures in place for the evacuation and clearance of the station area. The National Rail Administration in its capacity as infrastructure manager shall define requirements for the railway undertakings through the track access agreements, and thereby also define requirements for, inter alia, escape and evacuation plans and the coordination of routines and procedures.
The Accident Investigation Board Norway recommends that the Norwegian Railway Authority review safety-related organisational factors at all stations that concern more than one enterprise. This is in order to clarify ownership and leasing matters, and to ensure that emergency response and evacuation procedures are functional and based on a correct interface between the National Railway Authority as the chief authority and the other enterprises.
Facts
| Location | Gardermoen Station |
| Occurrence date | 07.10.2012 |
| Train No | 3560 |
| Type of Transportation | Passenger train |
| Type of occurrence | Fire and smoke development |
| Rolling Stock | Multippel Unit (MU) |