Report on marine accident, Marina LK 6603, 2 March 2009

Approximately 7:20 AM, Marina arrived and was ready to start hauling. Normally this operation was started from the south end of the lines. The fishing was very good and because of the good catch, combined with fairly strong current, the hauling came to an end when the first of the three vats of line already in the water had been hauled. The time was now approximately 8:30 AM.

It was normal winter weather with a moderate to fresh south easterly breeze, occasionally strong. The wind waves (1.5 metres towards northwest) and swells (2 metres towards north east) were moving in different directions and causing unstable sea conditions with a strengthening of some wave tops. There was a current of about 1 - 1.5 knots towards the north east.

After the fish had been bled and put into the hold, Marina changed position to the north end of the long line and continued hauling. When hauling was completed, the Accident Investigation Board (AIBN) estimates that there was up to 1,500kg of ungutted fish on board, in addition to a double haul of line. Since the hold only takes about 550kg, around 900 kg was carried on deck. More than half of the deck load, about 500kg was unrestrained on deck.  When hauling was completed, Marina set course for the inner (southern) end to deploy new long lines.

When in position, the lines were ready for deployment. It is not clear whether deploying the lines was actually started. AIBN believes that unrestrained fish on deck probably shifted towards the gunwale. The fish may have started shifting as the result of a large wave, the unstable sea conditions or wind waves on the vessel’s quarter. The stability calculations that have been made for AIBN show that such a movement of the load would have led to a list of 12 degrees and marginal residual stability. This would have led to the freeboard of the engine’s air intake being reduced and the turbulent sea would have filled the engine compartment quickly. Marina probably sank quickly, stern first. The subsequent search for the fisherman was without result.

According to its mandate, AIBN has carried out a safety investigation, in order to clarify the sequence of events and to reveal the underlying causes, with the aim of giving safety recommendations to prevent similar accidents in future. The safety investigation concludes that Marina’s poor stability, combined with the unrestrained fish on deck and the poor location of the engine air intake had a decisive effect on the loss of the vessel.

The safety investigation revealed that Marina did not comply with requirements of the Nordic Boat Standard for commercial fishing vessels in respect of stability, air intake, deck hatches and drainage from deck. The vessel is considered to be unsuitable for this type of fishing activity.

The investigation has revealed underlying safety factors in connection with the boat builders marketing of this boat type as a commercial fishing vessel, even though it only satisfies the requirements for leisure boats. Another safety factor is that the vessel have been given a type designation as fishing vessel in official Norwegian documents and registers, without any assessment or checks of whether it complied with the technical and safety requirements for a commercial fishing boat. In selling this type of vessel, the impression was given that it could be used by fishermen as a commercial fishing vessel. Fishing vessels of this size are not currently subject to periodic control by the authorities, and unannounced inspections have not had sufficient focus on technical building requirements. There is no requirement for hydrostatic release mechanisms for inflatable life rafts for fishing vessels of this size.

In connection with this accident, AIBN issues 6 safety recommendations. These are addressed to the boat builder in respect of the construction of fishing vessels, to the Norwegian Maritime Directorate, the Directorate of Fisheries and the Norwegian Ship Register in respect of identification, registration and
control of fishing vessels and to fishermen in respect of the safe operation of fishing vessels. The board also recommends introducing requirements for hydrostatic release mechanisms for inflatable life rafts for fishing vessels of an overall length of less than10.67 metres (35 feet).