Report on loss of propulsion and near grounding of Viking Sky, Hustadvika, Norway 23 March 2019

On 23 March 2019 Viking Sky was less than a ship length from running aground during a storm in Hustadvika, Norway. With more than 1,300 persons on board, the cruise ship suffered a blackout due to loss of lubricating oil pressure caused by insufficient lube oil in the engines’ sump tanks.

The investigation has shown that the lube oil sump tank design did not comply with SOLAS II-1, Part C, Regulation 26.6 and LR Class Rules Part 5, Chapter 1, Section 3.7 on safe operation under dynamic inclination nor with the recommendations of the engine manufacturer. The sump tank design is critical to safe engine operation, yet the shipyard's design process did not effectively ensure that the lube oil sump tanks complied with the SOLAS requirement for safe operation under dynamic inclination.

The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that Fincantieri review and strengthen the design process to ensure that lube oil sump tanks are designed and built in compliance with the SOLAS regulation and Class Rules in the future. Fincantieri is also recommended to investigate if any other ships designed at the yard may have non-compliant lube oil sump tanks and take necessary action if relevant.

On 23 March 2019 Viking Sky was less than a ship length from running aground during a storm in Hustadvika, Norway. With more than 1,300 persons on board, the cruise ship suffered a blackout due to loss of lubricating oil pressure caused by insufficient lube oil in the engines’ sump tanks.

The investigation has shown that the lube oil sump tank design did not comply with SOLAS II-1, Part C, Regulation 26.6 and LR Class Rules Part 5, Chapter 1, Section 3.7 on safe operation under dynamic inclination nor with the recommendations of the engine manufacturer. The sump tank design is critical to safe engine operation, yet Lloyd’s Register did not independently verify compliance with either the engine manufacturer’s instructions, the SOLAS regulation or LR’s own Class Rules.

The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that Lloyd’s Register review and strengthen the plan approval process to ensure that lube oil sump tanks are designed and built in compliance with the SOLAS regulation and Class Rules.

On 23 March 2019 Viking Sky was less than a ship length from running aground during a storm in Hustadvika, Norway. With more than 1,300 persons on board, the cruise ship suffered a blackout due to loss of lubricating oil pressure caused by insufficient lube oil in the engines’ sump tanks.

The investigation has shown that the lube oil sump tank design did not comply with the SOLAS II-1, Part C, Regulation 26.6 and LR Class Rules Part 5, Chapter 1, Section 3.7 on safe operation under dynamic inclination nor with the recommendations of the engine manufacturer. The operational limitations associated with the tank design in terms of dynamic inclination angles or corresponding sea conditions have not been calculated. The crew on board the vessels therefore didn’t have the safety critical information necessary to know the limits of safe operation.

The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that Wilhelmsen Ship Management, in cooperation with Viking Ocean Cruises, take necessary action to ensure the vessels are compliant with the SOLAS regulation through calculation and implementation of operating restrictions associated with the current tank design, modification of the tank design, or a combination of both.

On 23 March 2019 Viking Sky was less than a ship length from running aground during a storm in Hustadvika, Norway. With more than 1,300 persons on board, the cruise ship suffered a blackout due to loss of lubricating oil pressure caused by insufficient lube oil in the engines’ sump tanks.

The investigation has shown that the lube oil sump tank design did not comply with the SOLAS II-1, Part C, Regulation 26.6 and LR Class Rules Part 5, Chapter 1, Section 3.7 on safe operation under dynamic inclination nor with the recommendations of the engine manufacturer. The operational limitations associated with the actual tank design in terms of dynamic inclination angles or corresponding sea conditions have not been calculated. The crew on board the vessels therefore didn’t have the safety critical information necessary to know the limits of safe operation.

The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that Lloyd’s Register require action to ensure Viking Sky and its sister vessels are compliant with the SOLAS regulation and LR Class Rules through calculation and implementation of operating restrictions associated with the current tank design, modification of the tank design, or a combination of both.

On 23 March 2019 Viking Sky was less than a ship length from running aground during a storm in Hustadvika, Norway. With more than 1,300 persons on board, the cruise ship suffered a blackout due to loss of lubricating oil pressure caused by insufficient lube oil in the engines’ sump tanks.

The investigation has shown that the lube oil sump tank design did not comply with the SOLAS II-1, Part C, Regulation 26.6 and LR Class Rules Part 5, Chapter 1, Section 3.7 on safe operation under dynamic inclination nor with the recommendations of the engine manufacturer. The operational limitations associated with the actual tank design in terms of dynamic inclination angles or corresponding sea conditions have not been calculated. The crew on board the vessels therefore didn’t have the safety critical information necessary to know the limits of safe operation.

The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that the Norwegian Maritime Authority require action to ensure Viking Sky and its sister vessels are compliant with the SOLAS regulation through calculation and implementation of operating restrictions associated with the current tank design, modification of the tank design, or a combination of both.

On 23 March 2019 Viking Sky was less than a ship length from running aground during a storm in Hustadvika, Norway. With more than 1,300 persons on board, the cruise ship suffered a blackout due to loss of lubricating oil pressure caused by insufficient lube oil in the engines’ sump tanks.

The investigation has shown that the lube oil sump tank design did not comply with the SOLAS II-1, Part C, Regulation 26.6 and LR Class Rules Part 5, Chapter 1, Section 3.7 on safe operation under dynamic inclination nor with the recommendations of the engine manufacturer. The SOLAS regulation specifies the dynamic pitch and roll amplitudes under which the machinery shall be able to operate safely. However, neither SOLAS nor IACS UR M46 provide unambiguous information on the period, duration or pattern of the movement over time to be used for the application of, or verification of compliance with, the regulation. No technical guideline or industry standard for application of the SOLAS requirement exists.

The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that the Norwegian Maritime Authority make a proposal to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) that a technical guideline on the application of SOLAS Chapter II-1, Part C, Regulation 26.6 shall be developed.

On 23 March 2019 Viking Sky was less than a ship length from running aground during a storm in Hustadvika, Norway. With more than 1,300 persons on board, the cruise ship suffered a blackout due to loss of lubricating oil pressure caused by insufficient lube oil in the engines’ sump tanks.

The investigation has shown that the lube oil sump tank design did not comply with the SOLAS II-1, Part C, Regulation 26.6 and LR Class Rules Part 5, Chapter 1, Section 3.7 on safe operation under dynamic inclination nor with the recommendations of the engine manufacturer. The SOLAS regulation specifies the dynamic pitch and roll amplitudes under which the machinery shall be able to operate safely. However, neither SOLAS nor IACS UR M46 provide unambiguous information on the period, duration or pattern of the movement over time to be used for the application of, or verification of compliance with, the regulation. No technical guideline or industry standard for application of the SOLAS requirement exists.

The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that Lloyd’s Register make a proposal to the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) that a technical guideline on the application of SOLAS Chapter II-1, Part C, Regulation 26.6 shall be developed.

On 23 March 2019 Viking Sky was less than a ship length from running aground during a storm in Hustadvika, Norway. With more than 1,300 persons on board, the cruise ship suffered a blackout due to loss of lubricating oil pressure caused by insufficient lube oil in the engines’ sump tanks.

The investigation has shown that the lube oil sump tank design did not comply with the SOLAS II-1, Part C, Regulation 26.6 and LR Class Rules Part 5, Chapter 1, Section 3.7 on safe operation under dynamic inclination nor with the recommendations of the engine manufacturer. Viking Sky was not required to be, nor was it fitted with a type-approved electronic inclinometer providing recordings to the VDR. Hence, inclination angle data from the vessel’s fuel efficiency management system was used in the investigation. An electronic inclinometer providing recordings to the VDR would more efficiently provide reliable data for safety investigations and may thereby contribute to improve safety at sea.

The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that the Norwegian Maritime Authority make a proposal to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) that inclinometer information compliant with the technical requirements of resolution MSC.363(92) is recorded on the VDRs of all SOLAS ships with a gross tonnage of 3,000 and above.

On 23 March 2019 Viking Sky was less than a ship length from running aground during a storm in Hustadvika, Norway. With more than 1,300 persons on board, the cruise ship suffered a blackout due to loss of lubricating oil pressure caused by insufficient lube oil in the engines’ sump tanks.

The investigation has shown that the lube oil sump tank design did not comply with the SOLAS II-1, Part C, Regulation 26.6 and LR Class Rules Part 5, Chapter 1, Section 3.7 on safe operation under dynamic inclination nor with the recommendations of the engine manufacturer. The ship management company has implemented a new procedure for lube oil management to maintain higher lube oil levels. It is uncertain whether the revised procedure fully remedy the safety issue as it does not document that the increased oil levels lead to compliance with the SOLAS regulation nor what the operating limitations associated with the increased oil levels are. The crew on board the vessels therefore don’t have the safety critical information necessary to know the limits of safe operation with respect to dynamic inclination angles or corresponding sea conditions.

The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that Wilhelmsen Ship Management, develop and implement a new procedure for lube oil level management, and calculate and implement the associated operating restrictions, to ensure safe operation in compliance with the SOLAS requirement and in accordance with the engine manufacturer’s recommendations.

On 23 March 2019 Viking Sky was less than a ship length from running aground during a storm in Hustadvika, Norway. With more than 1,300 persons on board, the cruise ship suffered a blackout due to loss of lubricating oil pressure caused by insufficient lube oil in the engines’ sump tanks.

The investigation has shown that the remote lube oil sump tank level monitoring system was complex and the resulting on board measurements inaccurate and unreliable. The as-built sensor pipe offset, representing the physical fixed distance from the bottom of the tank to the bottom of the level sensor tube, was not recorded by the shipyard. The yard did not take into account the equipment maker’s recommended minimum distance between the sensor tube and oil suction pipe. In addition, the 3D-model used to convert the level measurements to oil volumes for diesel generator 1 (DG1) was erroneous, causing a significant measurement error.

The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that Wilhelmsen Ship Management, in cooperation with Viking Ocean Cruises, carry out a systematic and holistic review of the remote lube oil sump tank level monitoring system and ensure the vessels are fitted with an accurate and trustworthy remote monitoring system.

On 23 March 2019 Viking Sky was less than a ship length from running aground during a storm in Hustadvika, Norway. With more than 1,300 persons on board, the cruise ship suffered a blackout due to loss of lubricating oil pressure caused by insufficient lube oil in the engines’ sump tanks.

The investigation has shown that the remote lube oil sump tank level monitoring system was complex and the resulting on board measurements inaccurate and unreliable. The as-built sensor pipe offset, representing the physical fixed distance from the bottom of the tank to the bottom of the level sensor tube, was not registered. The yard did not take into account the equipment maker’s recommended minimum distance between the sensor tube and oil suction pipe. In addition the 3D-model used to convert the level measurements to oil volumes for DG1 was erroneous, causing a significant measurement error.

The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that Fincantieri carry out a systematic and holistic review of the remote lube oil sump tank level monitoring system and take the necessary actions to ensure that future vessels are fitted with a sufficiently accurate and trustworthy remote lube oil sump tank level monitoring system.

On 23 March 2019 Viking Sky was less than a ship length from running aground during a storm in Hustadvika, Norway. With more than 1,300 persons on board, the cruise ship suffered a blackout due to loss of lubricating oil pressure caused by insufficient lube oil in the engines’ sump tanks.

The investigation has found several design and configuration issues related to the engine control room alarm system that likely had a negative impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of engineering officers on watch.

The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that Wilhelmsen Ship Management, in cooperation with Viking Ocean Cruises, carry out an operator centric design and configuration review of the engine room alarm system and implement identified improvements.

On 23 March 2019 Viking Sky was less than a ship length from running aground during a storm in Hustadvika, Norway, with more than 1,300 persons on board, as it suffered a blackout due to loss of lubricating oil pressure caused by insufficient lube oil in the engines’ sump tanks.

The investigation has found several design and configuration issues related to the engine control room alarm system that likely had a negative impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of engineering officers on watch. Ships’ engine room alarm management are not subject to any regulation equivalent to the Bridge Alert Management (BAM) performance standards, with the result that many of these systems, such as the alarm system on Viking Sky and its sister vessels, do not have an optimal design and configuration.

The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that the Norwegian Maritime Authority make a proposal to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) that an engine room alarm management performance standard shall be developed.

On 23 March 2019 Viking Sky was less than a ship length from running aground during a storm in Hustadvika, Norway. With more than 1,300 persons on board, the cruise ship suffered a blackout due to loss of lubricating oil pressure caused by insufficient lube oil in the engines’ sump tanks.

The blackout recovery was time consuming, and it took 39 minutes from the blackout until both propulsion motors were operational and the ship had sufficient power available to maintain between 1 and 5 knots ahead. It has been difficult to understand why it took so long before filling of oil was started and why the crew continued to struggle to restore power and propulsion. Recording of sound from the engine control room could have provided valuable insights and contributed to better understanding the interaction in the engine control room and the safety issues present.

The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that the Norwegian Maritime Authority make a proposal to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) that the VDR performance standard is amended to also include recording of sound from the engine control room.