Report on fire on board ‘MS Brim’ in the outer Oslofjord on 11 March 2021

On 11 March 2021, a fire arose in the starboard battery room of the passenger vessel ‘Brim’ in the outer Oslofjord. The investigation has shown that there were several weaknesses associated with the propagation test used to identify the battery’s likelihood of cell-to-cell propagation and that the test failed to identify the possibility of side wall rupture. DNV’s rules, based on the IEC 62619 standard, provide for a free choice between the approved methods of propagation testing. The method chosen was not appropriate for the battery type in question.

The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that the Norwegian Maritime Authority issue requirements for appropriate test methods that reflect the risks associated with the design of different battery types to be chosen for conducting propagation tests.

On 11 March 2021, a fire arose in the starboard battery room of the passenger vessel ‘Brim’ in the outer Oslofjord. The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority cannot see that the load line requirements are adapted so as to prevent small amounts of seawater from entering a battery room and ensure battery safety. The investigation has shown that the positioning of the ventilation outlet in the tunnel was unfavourable and that measures to prevent water ingress were insufficient. The ventilation should have functioned as a safety barrier by extracting explosive gases in the event of an incident, but instead it contributed to sea air or seawater entering the battery room, resulting in short circuiting / electric arcs and fire.

The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that the Norwegian Maritime Authority ensure that battery safety regulations be developed so that ventilation arrangements do not contribute to batteries and high-voltage components being exposed to humid sea air or seawater.

On 11 March 2021, a fire arose in the starboard battery room of the passenger vessel ‘Brim’ in the outer Oslofjord. The investigation has found that the bulkhead between the engine room and the battery room was not smokeproof. Toxic gases spread to adjacent rooms. This was not detected in connection with approval of the drawings, construction follow-up or inspections. There is a need for better quality assurance of the execution of fire insulation of battery rooms through additional measures that ensure that gas and smoke do not penetrate the fire division, as defined in Regulations No 1099 of 1 July 2014 on fire protection on ships.

The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that the Norwegian Maritime Authority introduce additional measures to verify that installations are smokeproof and ensure fire integrity.

On 11 March 2021, a fire arose in the starboard battery room of the passenger vessel ‘Brim’ in the outer Oslofjord. The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority cannot see that the risk assessment reflected the real risk of fire in the battery packs, as neither the weaknesses of the ventilation system nor those of the battery system were sufficiently identified. A risk assessment should address all relevant risks identified by various disciplines, that together present a risk to the vessel. Taken together, this will potentially uncover weaknesses in the vessel design and identify risks associated with the use of lithium-ion batteries.

The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that the Norwegian Maritime Authority issue requirements for risk assessments relating to the use of lithium-ion batteries, and that they should contain all relevant risks identified by different disciplines, the sum of which represents the vessel’s fire risk.

On 11 March 2021, a fire arose in the starboard battery room of the passenger vessel ‘Brim’ in the outer Oslofjord. The Norwegian Maritime Authority does not have separate regulations relating to battery safety, but relies on classification rules. There were shortcomings in the battery safety regulations for the class. Furthermore, the classification societies may have different requirements for battery safety, which can result in different vessels having different standards of battery safety. Different supervisory bodies may be involved in the supervision of vessels and marine equipment, which was also the case for this vessel. In the Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority’s opinion, this represents a safety risk that requires better coordination between the different agencies.

The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that the Norwegian Maritime Authority, as the administrative authority, cooperate with Directorate for Civil Protection on stipulating a requirement that all Norwegian vessels, regardless of classification, must be built to a defined standard that ensures battery safety.

On 11 March 2021, a fire arose in the starboard battery room of the passenger vessel ‘Brim’ in the outer Oslofjord. The investigation has shown that Novec had little effect on the development of the fire, and that there are currently no effective suppression agents available capable of preventing fire and propagation in lithium-ion batteries.

The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that the Norwegian Maritime Authority introduce compensatory measures to address the safety of passengers and crew in the event of a lithium-ion battery fire.

On 11 March 2021, a fire arose in the starboard battery room of the passenger vessel ‘Brim’ in the outer Oslofjord. The investigation has identified a need to raise the knowledge and expertise of the parties involved in first-line emergency response in connection with fires in lithium-ion battery systems on board vessels.

The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that the Directorate for Civil Protection strengthen the knowledge and expertise of the parties involved in the first-line response to accidents involving a fire on board a vessel carrying lithium-ion batteries.