Marine accident involving the cargo vessel Eidsvaag Marin northwest of Stavanger, 29 October 2025

The accident was quickly discovered by the crew. However, when the crew reached the material handler, the engine attendant was trapped and unconscious. The crew attempted to free the engine attendant but were unable to do so. The engine attendant was freed shortly after the vessel arrived ashore but died from the injuries sustained.Based on the movement of the lifting frame when hydraulic pressure was lost, the Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority considers that the lifting frame had not been moved sufficiently far forward to pass its point of equilibrium before the work began. If the lifting frame has not passed this point, its own weight will cause the lifting frame, and consequently the cab, to move backwards if hydraulic pressure is lost.The investigation found that there was no physical barrier capable of preventing the uncontrolled movement of the lifting frame. In practice, safety depended on an operational barrier, namely that the cab was moved fully forward before work began. As this condition had not been met, there was no safety barrier capable of preventing the occurrence from developing into a fatal accident. The material handler’s operating manual specified that a locking collar was to be used to prevent crushing injuries when working beneath the lifting frame. However, the locking collar was not included in the standard delivery and was not available on board.The risks associated with maintenance work on the material handler’s hydraulic system were not adequately addressed through the shipping company’s safety management system. There was no procedure, risk assessment or job safety analysis for the work, and it was not specified that the cab was to be moved fully forward during maintenance work behind the lifting frame. The shipping company’s follow-up and internal control activities were also insufficient to identify and rectify these weaknesses. The deficiencies were not identified through the shipping company’s internal audits or during external inspections.The investigation also found that the design of the material handler’s integrated platform arrangement may have influenced how maintenance work behind the lifting frame was carried out. When the cab was moved fully forward, a gap was created between the section of the platform attached to the cab and the section permanently installed by the tank behind the cab. This gap was too wide to cross safely. In addition, the distance down to the hatch cover was too great to permit safe access without using suitable access equipment. The design of the platform arrangement may therefore have made working with the cab only partially moved forward appear more practical than moving the cab fully forward.Following the accident, the shipping company implemented and initiated several measures. The Norwegian Maritime Authority also followed up the accident through an inspection and the issuance of an order, and announced that it would issue a safety notice. At the same time, new regulations are being developed, and proposed regulations concerning lifting appliances, loose lifting gear and lifting operations on ships have been circulated for consultation. In view of the measures implemented and initiated following the accident, the Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority does not issue any safety recommendations.