Report on marine accident Federal Kivalina - IMO NO. 9205885 grounding at Årsundøya, Norway 6 October 2008

The analysis of the accident revealed a gradual loss of control over the navigation, which started as early as from the pilot boarding place at Grip, before the pilot came on board. The loss of control occurred gradually, without the ship's bridge crew or the pilot noticing this. The necessary corrective measures were thus not implemented in time.

The investigation revealed that the ship's bridge crew was not sufficiently prepared for the five-hour voyage from the pilot boarding place to the quay. Further analysis revealed that, after arrival at the pilot boarding place at Grip, the bridge team did not function as intended. This means, in part, that the ship's bridge crew did not function as a bridge team, and in part that there were concurrent and mutual expectations among the ship's bridge crew and pilot that it was not necessary to function as a bridge team, and in part that the piloting service did not stipulate sufficient requirements that the pilot shall be part of the bridge team. The criteria for when the ship could safely come alongside the quay were left to an individual assessment on board the vessel. The owner of the quay facility, the ship's agent/terminal representative and the piloting service did not make sufficient preparations for the assignment for the pilot and the ship's bridge crew.

The investigation of the marine accident revealed six areas where the AIBN finds it necessary to make safety recommendations for the purpose of improving marine safety. These safety recommendations are aimed at the ship management company, the Norwegian National Coastal Administration, the operator of the quay facility and the ship’s agent/terminal representative.