Report on marine accident Finnøyglimt - LNIM foundered at Sletta north of Haugesund 7 October 2011
Marine report 2014/09 eng
Late at the evening 7 October 2011 the bulk carrier Finnøyglimt foundered at Sletta north of Haugesund. The captain deceased, while the able seaman and the engineer managed to get aboard a mob-boat and were later picked up by another vessel.
The AIBN's investigation concludes that Finnøyglimt probably took in water through leaking hatches. The cargo hatches were not secured, and forward trim resulted in a particularly large amount of green sea on deck. The water ingress probable caused shifting of the sand cargo in the aft part of the hold. When Finnøyglimt passed Tømmerflua at around 23:00, the vessel may have had a list of 3.5°. The list and forward trim increased as the vessel took in more and more water. Finally, the vessel lost buoyancy and sank east of Ramnsholmene.
In the AIBN's opinion, Finnøyglimt was designed with the cargo hold too far forward. In homogenous load condition, the vessel would therefore be trimmed forward. The investigation also uncovered that it was not established practice to secure the cargo hatch covers before departure. In the AIBN's opinion, the vessel's minimal crew may also have affected the preparations made prior to the voyage and resulted in the hatch covers not being secured.
After the accident, the AIBN commissioned SINTEF to analyse the properties of the sand and the aggregate. One important conclusion in the SINTEF report was that the addition of moisture would 'liquefy' the sand, i.e. a layer would form in which friction between the sand particles was reduced. This means that, if the moisture content of the sand were to reach 11.5% and the vessel was rolling, the sand could shift even though it had been levelled out. The shipper had not looked into this matter and had thus not the basis for informing the vessel's crew about the risk of such a cargo shift, as required by regulations.
The AIBN proposes three safety recommendations in this report. The first safety recommendation is addressed to the shipper to look into the properties of the products being shipped from its facilities and otherwise comply with the provisions of the Norwegian Regulations concerning the carriage of cargoes on ships and barges (the Cargo Carriage Regulations) as amended from time to time as regards providing information to ships about the properties of the cargo. The second safety recommendation is addressed to the Norwegian Maritime Authority (NMA) to take measures to determine the scope of the problem of shippers not informing ships about the properties of the cargo, and that it implement relevant measures to ensure that the provisions of the currently applicable Cargo Carriage Regulations are complied with. Thirdly, the Norwegian Maritime Authority is recommended to review its administrative practice relating to minimum safe manning by clarifying the term 'daytime arrangement'.
The AIBN's report also refers to earlier Recommendation MARINE No 2012/04T, in which the AIBN recommended that the NMA order cargo ships for which stability calculations have not been carried out using an approved program, to procure new and complete trim and stability documentation; to Recommendation MARINE No 2012/05T, in which the AIBN recommended that the NMA introduce provisions on maximum forward trim/ minimum bow height; to Recommendation MARINE No 2012/07T, in which the AIBN recommended that the NMA take measures to increase awareness in the industry of risks associated with inadequate securing of hatches, and Recommendation MARINE No 2010/24T, in which the AIBN recommended that the NMA specify the scope of safety management systems for cargo ships with a gross tonnage of less than 500.
Finnøyglimt. Photo: Tor Erlend Gjærde
Safety recommendation
Safety Recommendation MARINE No 2014/17T
The AIBN’s investigation into the foundering of the cargo ship Finnøyglimt on 7 October 2011 has shown that sand (0–8 mm) shipped from the NCC Roads AS’s facility in Helle has the property that it may ‘liquefy’ when the moisture content exceeds a certain limit. This can cause cargo that is being shipped from the facility to shift during transport if adequate precautions are not taken.
The Accident Investigation Board Norway recommends that NCC Roads AS look into the properties of the products being shipped from its facilities and ensure compliance with the provisions of the regulations concerning the carriage of cargo in bulk, as applicable from time to time, by providing information to ships that load such products.
Safety Recommendation MARINE No 2014/18T
The AIBN’s investigation of the accident involving the cargo ship Finnøyglimt on 7 October 2011 has shown that the shipper had not looked into the properties of the sand or informed the ship about the risk of the cargo ‘liquefying’ at a given moisture level. The AIBN assumes that other shippers may also be unaware of the provisions in the applicable Regulations on the carriage of cargoes on cargo ships and barges with regard to determining and providing information about the properties of the cargo. The consequences may be that the ships’ crew fail to take necessary precautions in relation to the cargo.
The Accident Investigation Board Norway recommends that the Norwegian Maritime Authority look into the scope of the problem and implement relevant measures to ensure that the provisions of the currently applicable Regulations concerning the carriage of cargoes on cargo ships and barges are complied with.
Safety Recommendation MARINE No 2014/19T
The AIBN’s investigation into the foundering of the cargo ship Finnøyglimt on 7 October 2011 has shown that the NMA, when issuing minimum safe manning documents, uses the term ‘daytime arrangement’ to describe circumstances in which the shipping company is allowed to reduce the number of crew. Since the term ‘daytime arrangement’ has not been formally defined, it can result in the shipping company reducing the number of crew on an incorrect basis.
The Accident Investigation Board Norway recommends that the Norwegian Maritime Authority consider its practice relating to the stipulation of minimum safe manning pursuant to the Regulations of 18 June 2009 No 666 concerning the manning of Norwegian ships, and Regulations of 27 April 1999 No 537 concerning watchkeeping on passenger ships and cargo ships, by clarifying the term ‘daytime arrangement’.
Facts
| Location | Sletta, north of Haugesund |
| Occurrence date | 07.10.2011 |
| Accident category | Foundering |
| Area | Norwegian Territorial Waters |
| IMO number | 5341849 |
| Name of vessel | Finnøyglimt |
| Accident type | Fatal Accident, Shifting cargo |
| Vessel type | Bulk Cargo Ship |
| Register | The Norwegian Ship Register |