Report 2015/02
Marine report 2015/02
While trawling off the west coast of Lindesnes on Wednesday 12 February 2014, the trawler 'Carina', with two brothers on board, capsized and sank. Following an extensive search, 'Carina' was located at a depth of approximately 150 metres, 2.4 nautical miles south of Ullerøysund light. The trawl doors were located approximately 400 metres SSE of the vessel. 'Carina' was lying keel-down with a starboard list of approximately 25 degrees, and with her bow in the direction of the trawl doors. Both the missing persons were found inside the wheelhouse, and they were brought up and taken to shore. The investigation has found that a strong westerly current probably caused the trawling gear to become stuck on the seabed, on a raised area west of a narrow channel through which the two men on board planned to trawl. When the gear got stuck, the vessel was subjected to transverse heeling moments that initiated the capsizing. Water on deck from the following sea and the general wind, wave and current conditions probably caused additional strain on the vessel and reduced its stability. The total strain has probably contributed to causing the vessel to capsize.
The consequences of trawling gear becoming stuck can be serious, especially where the trawl wires run through blocks high up in the gallows. The immediate cause of ‘Carina’ capsizing was probably that the trawling gear became stuck on the seabed. ‘Carina’ was not equipped with any devices that would enable quick release of the trawl wires in an emergency. At present, there are no requirements for trawlers of less than 15 metres to substantiate that they have sufficient stability reserves to withstand the heeling moments that can arise in the event of gear becoming stuck or that they must be equipped with devices that enable quick release of the trawl wires. The AIBN therefore submits a safety recommendation to the Norwegian Maritime Authority that it identify and implement necessary measures also for trawlers of less than 15 meters with a view to prevent capsizing should trawling gear become stuck.
With a capsizing of ‘Carina’, the vessel’s lack of weathertight integrity foundered her. The fact that the cargo hatch was not closed and that the wheelhouse was not weathertight may have been of decisive importance to the outcome. At the time ‘Carina’ was built, there were regulations concerning weathertight integrity. The Norwegian Maritime Authority approved the vessel as a newbuild and it had carried out several inspections during ‘Carina’s’ lifetime, without ever pointing out the wheelhouse’s lack of weathertight integrity. The AIBN therefore submits a safety recommendation to the Norwegian Maritime Authority that it identify and implement necessary measures with a view to ensuring that weather-exposed doors and hatches on fishing vessels meet the requirements for weathertightness.
‘Carina’ was equipped with an open forecastle and a shelter panel on the port side. When the trawling gear probably became stuck, this led to ‘Carina’ turning and listing. It also caused the stern to be pulled downwards somewhat, and the following sea broke over the stern. The investigation shows that the list and forward trim of the vessel would increase if water accumulated on the deck and that water would accumulate towards the shelter panel and flow into the open forecastle. This significantly reduced the vessel’s stability and may have contributed to its capsizing and sinking. The regulations that applied until 1 January 1992 did not take sufficient account of the possibility of water accumulating in arrangements on weather-exposed decks. The AIBN recommends that the Norwegian Maritime Authority identify and implement necessary measures to ensure that fishing vessels built before 1 January 1992 do not have arrangements that can lead to water accumulating on weather-exposed decks and significantly reduce the vessel’s stability.
Safety recommendation
Safety Recommendation MARINE No 2015/02T
The investigation of the accident involving ‘Carina’ on 12 February 2014 shows that the list and forward trim of the vessel would increase if water accumulated on the deck and that water would accumulate towards the shelter panel and flow into the open forecastle. This significantly reduced the vessel’s stability and may have contributed to its capsizing and sinking. The regulations that applied until 1 January 1992 did not take sufficient account of the possibility of water accumulating in arrangements on weather-exposed decks.
The Accident Investigation Board Norway recommends that the Norwegian Maritime Authority identify and implement necessary measures to ensure that fishing vessels built before 1 January 1992 do not have arrangements that can lead to water accumulating on weather-exposed decks and significantly reduce the vessel’s stability.
Safety Recommendation MARINE No 2015/03T
The investigation of the accident involving ‘Carina’ on 12 February 2014 found that the vessel was only equipped with a light, wooden door with an ordinary door handle for closing the entrance on the starboard side of the wheelhouse. The wheelhouse’s lack of weathertightness probably led to a quicker loss of stability and flooding of the accommodation when the vessel heeled.
The Accident Investigation Board Norway therefore recommends that the Norwegian Maritime Authority identify and implement necessary measures for fishing vessels with a view to ensuring that weather-exposed doors and hatches meet the requirements for weathertightness.
Safety Recommendation MARINE No 2015/04T
The investigation of the accident involving ‘Carina’ on 12 February 2014 has found that the trawling gear probably became stuck. This led to ‘Carina’ turning, and a significant heeling moment arose. The AIBN believes that this was one of the immediate causes of ‘Carina’ capsizing. There are currently no requirements for vessels of less than 15 m to substantiate that they have the stability reserves to withstand the heeling moments that can arise in the event of gear becoming stuck. Nor is it a requirement that winches and machinery for hauling in trawls be arranged so that the desired tractive power can be set and the winch slackened if the pre-set tractive power is exceeded.
The Accident Investigation Board Norway recommends that the Norwegian Maritime Authority identify and implement necessary measures for trawlers of less than 15 meters to prevent capsizing should the trawling gear become stuck.
Facts
| Location | Near Lindesnes |
| Occurrence date | 12.02.2014 |
| Accident category | Foundering |
| Area | Norwegian Territorial Waters |
| Name of vessel | Carina |
| Accident type | Capsize |
| Vessel type | Fishing Vessel |
| Register | The Norwegian Ship Register |