Report on the foundering of Arv 2 (Iris) LG6159, registred as a fishing vessel, in Gloppefjorden on 20 October 2018
Marine report 2021/07
‘ARV 2’ foundered in Gloppefjorden due to water on deck and water ingress into the hull. One person died, while the other three on board managed to swim to shore. The investigation has found that ARVOR 215 AS does not meet requirements for fishing vessels in terms of design, freeboard and stability. In addition, the safety level of the boat as a recreational craft, documented by CE marking, was probably reduced because it was rigged as a fishing vessel. The NSIA recommends the Norwegian Maritime Authority to intensify the control of fishing vessels with a maximum length of between 6 and 8 metres.
At 16:00 on Saturday 20 October 2018, four people left Gimmestad in the Gloppefjord on board ‘ARV 2’, a boat with an overall length of 6.36 metres, registered as a fishing vessel. They were going out to haul Norway lobster pots that the fisherman who owned the boat had set in the Gloppefjord and Hyefjord. The boat was of the type ARVOR 215 AS, built to recreational craft standard (CE marked).
As the wind had started to rise, they only hauled one chain of pots off Kleppeneset in the Hyefjord. The catch was 15 Norway lobsters. On their way back, all four were seated at the forward end, in the wheelhouse and the small cabin. As they came round Kviteneset point, they encountered head sea. Choppy waves of about one metre in height constantly broke over the bow and into the deck well. When they saw that there was water on the floor of the cabin, they went out on deck to reduce the forward trim. By that time, a lot of water had accumulated on deck and the boat lay heavy in the sea. They tried to fetch emergency flares and lifejackets from the wheelhouse, but had to abandon the attempt, as the water came pouring in through the doorway. The fisherman increased the engine speed in an attempt to reach the shore, but the engine stopped after a short while. The stern started to sink and the boat capsized at approximately 18:30. All four of them ended up in the sea. They were approximately 100 metres from the shore. The temperature in the air and sea was around 10° C. The choppy waves and cold water made the swim to shore very demanding. One person died, while the other three made it ashore. The diseased was found after seven hours at a depth of 14 metres, 15–20 metres from the shore. The post mortem report showed that the deceased most likely died as a result of drowning.
The NSIA believes that the probable cause of water ingress into the vessel was a considerable forward trim and an ineffective deck draining arrangement. The freeing ports are only two small openings in the stern that in size make up only 4% of the minimum requirement for fishing vessels. The water that had accumulated on deck ingressed further down to the hull through leaky flush hatches in the deck and over the sill to the wheelhouse. The total amount of water in the hull and on deck caused the vessel to lose buoyancy and stability.
As a registered fishing vessel, it was also required to carry a life raft, lifebuoy and VHF radio, among other things. ‘ARV 2’ was not fitted with such equipment, and the fisherman was not aware that it was a requirement. A VHF radio could have helped them to alert someone that an accident had occurred or that the vessel was in distress at an earlier stage. A life raft and life buoy could have significantly increased the chances of surviving after the vessel capsized.
The investigation has shown that there are probably many fishing vessels with a length overall between 6 and 8 metres, built in or after 1992, that do not meet the applicable design requirements. Limited official control in the form of unannounced inspections of registered fishing vessels, in combination with a lack of effective barriers to prevent new vessels in this category from being registered as fishing vessels, have resulted in many vessels in this length category being operated at a high risk.
To reduce the likelihood of vessels that do not meet the design requirements being registered as fishing vessels, the Norwegian Maritime Authority (NMA) has, as of May 2021, revised the template to be used for confirmation of construction, which is required for such registration. These confirmations are not subject to official control, however. The NSIA believes that confirmations of construction should be reviewed by a competent authority and submits a safety recommendation to the NMA on this point. The NSIA is also of the view that the NMA should intensify its control of fishing vessels already registered in this length category to ensure that they are upgraded in accordance with the design requirements or cease to be used for commercial fishing. The NSIA also submits a safety recommendation to the NMA on this point.
Published 22.11.2021
Safety recommendation
Safety recommendation Marine No 2021/42T
The investigation of the accident involving ‘ARV 2’ on 20 October 2018 has uncovered that the fisherman was unaware of safety requirements for, among other things, rescue equipment and a VHF radio for fishing vessels with a length overall between 6 and 8 metres. The absence of a VHF radio meant that notification of the accident was delayed, and the absence of a life raft and life buoy meant that the chances of surviving after the vessel capsized were significantly reduced.
The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that the Norwegian Maritime Authority consider cooperating with the Directorate of Fisheries so that the latter can enclose guidance on equipment and trade areas for fishing vessels of less than 15 metres in its correspondence with owners of vessels seeking to be registered in the Register of Fishing Vessels.
Safety recommendation Marine No 2021/43T
The investigation of the accident involving ‘ARV 2’ on 20 October 2018 has shown that there are probably many fishing vessels with a length overall between 6 and 8 metres, built in or after 1992, that do not meet the applicable design requirements. Official control, limited to unannounced inspections, does not seem to have prevented a large number of fishing vessels in this length category from being operated at a high risk.
The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that the Norwegian Maritime Authority intensify its control of fishing vessels with a length overall between 6 and 8 metres, built in or after 1992, to ensure that they are upgraded in accordance with the design requirements or cease to be used for commercial fishing.
Safety recommendation Marine No 2021/44T
The investigation of the accident involving ‘ARV 2’ on 20 October 2018 has shown that the barrier to prevent vessels with a length overall between 6 and 8 metres, built in or after 1992, that do not meet the design requirements, from being registered as fishing vessels has been inadequate, in that confirmations of construction are not reviewed by a competent authority.
The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that the Norwegian Maritime Authority establish a scheme whereby confirmations of construction are reviewed by the Norwegian Maritime Authority, or by enterprises approved by the Authority, to help to ensure that vessels engaged in commercial fishing comply with the design requirements.
Facts
| Location | Gloppefjorden, Vestland county |
| Occurrence date | 20.10.2018 |
| Accident category | Foundering |
| Area | Norwegian Territorial Waters |
| Name of vessel | ARV 2 (Iris) |
| Accident type | Fatal Accident, Loss of stability |
| Vessel type | Fishing Vessel |
| Register | The Norwegian Ship Register |