Report on accident, E6 by Åsen, Levanger 27 June 2006

After loading at about 0715, the road train followed E6 north towards Steinkjer. About 1 km south of Åsen in Levanger the road has an S-curve. In the last right curve the road train tipped over, and simultaneously the lorry’s tank bodywork fell off. The bitumen which had a temperature of about 175C leaked out and covered a large area of the road. The driver did not wear the seat belt, and was inflicted injuries in the back/arm and chest area.

The investigation reveals a speed at about 80 km/h into the last right curve. This is about 10 km/h above permissible speed, and close to the critical tipping velocity for both lorry and trailer. The Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN) has concluded that several factors contributed to the accident, including the road train’s speed in combination with defects in the lorry’s tank bodywork and the road design.

The investigation has revealed that the lorry’s tank bodywork had not been installed according to the manufacturer’s instructions or in other ways which ensured satisfactory safety. The tank bodywork was among other things not secured against lateral displacement. Størseth Transport AS, who installed the new tank bodywork, did neither have acceptance for this type of work on vehicles, nor present the vehicle for control with the inspection authority as required after the rebuilding.

The investigation has also revealed insufficient routines with the inspection authority, Norwegian Public Roads Administration (NPRA), in relation to postponement of periodical vehicle control (PVC), and also the follow-up of unapproved rebuilding of vehicles in connection with PVC. In addition, NCC had not ensured the safety requirements they had set on Størseth Transport in connection with the car leasing. NCC had neither carried out safety assessments of the risk elements in performing this particular transport.

The bitumen was not classified as dangerous goods, while the propane was classified as dangerous goods though not subject to existing transport regulations since it was excepted from these. This resulted in no specific requirements set on vehicle, driver or the transport beyond the requirements of the Road Traffic Act with underlying regulations. The AIBN believes that more specific requirements for this transport could have prevented the course of events and the outcome of the accident.

As a result of this investigation, the AIBN has made four safety recommendations.