2013/05

The investigation into the fire in the Oslofjord tunnel on 23 June 2011 has shown that the preconditions for the self-rescue principle were absent as a result of the tunnel's safety equipment and emergency preparedness solution, resulting in several road-users being trapped in the smoke. The AIBN points out the lack of a comprehensive assessment of the interaction between information to road-users, safety equipment, ventilation solution/smoke control, firefighting and safe road-user evacuation (self-rescue) as a basis for the tunnel's emergency preparedness plan.

The Accident Investigation Board Norway recommends that the Norwegian Public Roads Administration, along with the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection and the fire department, reviews and updates the emergency response plans for long single-lane tunnels, including the Road Traffic Centre's routines in the event of fire, to safeguard the preconditions for the self-rescue principle.

The investigation into the fire in the Oslofjord tunnel on 23 June 2011 has uncovered that the Norwegian Public Roads Administration and Directorate for Civil Protection lacked a welldeveloped reporting system for monitoring and controlling fires and near-fires in road tunnels. This has led to missing reports, deficient analyses and an insufficient overview of the real safety level for the Oslofjord tunnel.

The Accident Investigation Board Norway recommends that the Norwegian Public Roads Administration and Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection establish systems for registrations of fires and near-fires in road tunnels, for use in the systematic safety work.

At the time of the accident (23 June 2011), the safety level for the Oslofjord tunnel was not satisfactory. The AIBN basis for this assertion is the gap between the tunnel’s safety equipment and emergency preparedness solution seen against traffic volume development and composition. The AIBN is of the opinion that this is connected to the Norwegian Public Roads Administration's riskbased approach to safety and deficient emergency preparedness in the tunnel.

The Accident Investigation Board Norway recommends that the Norwegian Public Roads Administration develop its safety management system further as regards risk-based and pro-active principles to secure a satisfactory safety level for the Oslofjord tunnel and similar road tunnels.

The lorry truck fire in the Oslofjord tunnel on 23 June 2011, with a calculated fire effect of 70 – 90 MW, was extinguished in a satisfactory manner in spite of the tunnel and the capacity of the fire and rescue services only being dimensioned for a fire effect of 50 MW. The investigation has shown that the maximum fire effect for lorry truck fires ranges from 50 to 150 MW, and that rescue efforts in long and steep single-lane tunnels pose great demands on firefighters and the safety equipment of the tunnel. This, and not the dimensioning requirements for the tunnel class alone, should in the AIBN's opinion form the basis for required equipment and emergency preparedness in tunnels.

The Accident Investigation Board Norway recommends that the Norwegian Public Roads Administration, along with the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection and the fire department, follows up and dimensions the rescue and firefighting effort to realistic fire effects and the specific design of the tunnel in question.