Report on a head-on collision between two heavy goods vehicles (HGV) on county road 33 in Etnedal on 30 October 2024

The accident on 30 October 2024 on county road Fv. 33 along Tonsåslinna, involving two heavy goods vehicles, occurred when one of the vehicles skidded while exiting a curve, jackknifed, and crossed into the oncoming lane. The road surface at the accident site was covered by a layer of ice. This came as a surprise to the driver, who had just come from an area with bare (dry) road conditions and was driving at a speed just below the speed limit.

The contractor’s assessment of operational measures was based on visual inspection, data from a weather station, alerts from the Traffic Control Centre, and communication with a road user, but this information did not reveal that the road was slippery on the section where the accident occurred. The contractor had not described routines for monitoring the condition of the road network in its planning documents. As a result of the accident, a monitoring station will be installed at the accident site, which will help provide the contractor with a better basis for decision-making at that location. The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority (NSIA) believes that this issue may also be relevant in other places. Routines for monitoring the condition of the road network should therefore be established, particularly for road sections with large local variations in driving conditions.

The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that Brødrene Dokken AS establish routines for monitoring the condition of the road network in its planning documents, particularly for road sections with significant local variations in weather and driving conditions.

The accident on 30 October 2024 on county road Fv. 33 along Tonsåslinna, involving two heavy goods vehicles, occurred when one of the vehicles skidded while exiting a curve, jackknifed, and crossed into the oncoming lane. The road surface at the accident site was covered by a layer of ice. This came as a surprise to the driver, who had just come from an area with bare (dry) road conditions and was driving at a speed just below the speed limit.

The contractor’s assessment of operational measures was based on visual inspection, data from a weather station, alerts from the Traffic Control Centre, and communication with a road user, but this information did not reveal that the road was slippery on the section where the accident occurred. The contractor had not described routines for monitoring the condition of the road network in its planning documents. As a result of the accident, a monitoring station will be installed at the accident site, which will help provide the contractor with a better basis for decision-making at that location. The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority (NSIA) believes that the findings of the investigation may also be applicable to other road authorities, and that there may be a need for improved decision-making support and monitoring routines on road sections known for local variations in driving conditions.

1. The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that the Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities County Councils raise the issue in the Professional Network for Operations and Maintenance, to ensure that the county authorities gain learning that the contractors must have a sufficient decision-making basis for operational measures on road sections known for local variations in driving conditions.
   
   
2. The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that Nye Veier AS ensures that the operations contractor has sufficient decision-making basis for operational measures on road sections known for local variations in driving conditions.
   
   
3. The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that the Norwegian Public Roads Administration ensures that the operations contractor has sufficient decision-making basis for operational measures on road sections known for local variations in driving conditions.

The accident on 30 October 2024 on county road Fv. 33 along Tonsåslinna, involving two heavy goods vehicles, occurred when one of the vehicles skidded while exiting a curve, jackknifed, and crossed into the oncoming lane. The road surface at the accident site was covered by a layer of ice. This came as a surprise to the driver, who had just come from an area with bare (dry) road conditions and was driving at a speed just below the speed limit.

The Traffic Control Centre (VTS) logged that they received three reports of slippery road conditions on Tonsåslinna during the two hours prior to the accident. One of these reports was not passed on to the operations contractor. In addition, VTS received a report from a road user that was neither logged nor forwarded to the contractor, despite the requirement that all public inquiries are to be passed on. The NSIA believes that contractors need all available decision support in order to implement timely and effective winter maintenance measures. This requires that VTS both records the time and location of reports from road users and forwards all reports to the contractor.

The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that the Norwegian Public Roads Administration ensure that the Traffic Control Centres forward all reports, including time and location information, to the relevant contractor.

The accident on 30 October 2024 on county road Fv. 33 along Tonsåslinna, involving two heavy goods vehicles, occurred when one of the vehicles skidded while exiting a curve, jackknifed, and crossed into the oncoming lane. The road surface at the accident site was covered by a layer of ice. This came as a surprise to the driver, who had just come from an area with bare (dry) road conditions and was driving at a speed just below the speed limit.

The operations contractor received information about slippery driving conditions on three occasions during the last three hours before the accident, but none of these reports were logged. There has also been conflicting information regarding the timing of the reports. The NSIA believes that the contractor must log the information received through reports so that it can be systematically used in the assessment of operational measures. Furthermore, the information can be used for evaluation and future learning. The contractor also did not inform the Traffic Control Centre (VTS) of its decision not to initiate salting, even though this is described in the routines for cooperation.

The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority recommends that Brødrene Dokken AS introduce routines to ensure that information received through reports is logged and systematically used for the assessment of operational measures, and that it improves its routines for communication with the Traffic Control Centres.