Report on a fire in a heavy goods vehicle on E134 in the Oslofjord tunnel on 2 August 2021
Road traffic report 2022/05
On Monday 2 August 2021, a heavy goods vehicle (HGV) on its way out of the Oslofjordtunnel on the Drøbak side, caught fire. The smoke from the fire was ventilated the shortest way out of the tunnel and the fire was extinguished within 35 minutes. No people were injured or was caught in smoke as a result of the fire, but the tunnel was closed for ten days as a result. The investigation has emphasized and why the vehicle stopped and how the subsequent fire occurred, how the fire developed and was handled by the Traffic Control Centre (VTS) and the fire service, as well as road users' behavior and self-rescue in connection with the fire.
The HGV with a total weight of approx. 28 tonnes lost its propulsion, started burning and stopped approx. 60 meters before the exit of the Oslofjord tunnel on the Drøbak side.
First ignition of the tractor. Screenshot: Vegtrafikksentralen, Norwegian Public Roads Administration
The fire inspection of the HGV indicates a bearing failure at the junction in the front link of the intermediate axle. This meant that the intermediate shaft came loose in the front flange and caused damage and fire under the tractor before the HGV came to a standstill. NSIA considers the consequential damage of the intermediate axle failure to be a probable cause of the fire.
Front link of the intermediate axle that lay in the roadway behind the HGV. Photo: NSIA
The ventilation principle has been changed since the last major fire in the Oslofjord tunnel in 2017. A zero point has been established in the middle of the tunnel, and a recommended fire ventilation direction to both sides depending on where in the tunnel the fire occurs. NSIA believes that the contingency plan and guidelines worked well for this incident, despite the fact that there were communication challenges and different situational understanding between the fire service and VTS in the initial phase of the fire.
The investigation also shows that it is important to establish a good understanding of the situation in the first minutes of the fire, before the cameras are covered by smoke, and that VTS may have to act during a period when other emergency services are under alert and/or emergency response.
Based on the incident, NSIA believes that interaction and good communication between the fire service and VTS is still very important and that there is a need to carry out realistic exercises that take care of this. Furthermore, it is important that the tunnel's contingency planning takes into account that heavy vehicles and buses use time and space to turn around, and that some road users who drive into the tunnel before it is closed do not necessarily follow the warning, but continue to drive towards a fire.
The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority does not issue any safety recommendations as a result of this investigation.
This report is in Norwegian only.
Published 08.07.2022
Facts
| Location | E134 Oslofjordtunnelen |
| Occurrence date | 02.08.2021 |
| Accident type | Fire in vehicle |
| Road class | European road |
| County | Viken |
| Police Disctrict | Øst |
| Vehicle type | Truck and trailer |
| Type of Transportation | Freight transport |
| Road region | Viken |
| Accident category | Ulykke i tunnel |